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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKING FOR SMART GRID
COMMUNICATIONS
by
Abdullah Aydeger
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Kemal Akkaya, Major Professor
Emerging Software Defined Networking (SDN) technology has provided excel-
lent flexibility to large-scale networks in terms of control, management, security, and
maintenance. On the other hand, recent years witnessed a tremendous growth of
the critical infrastructure networks, namely the Smart-Grid, in terms of its under-
lying communication infrastructure. Such large local networks requires significant
effort in terms of network management and security. We explore the potential uti-
lization of the SDN technology over the Smart Grid communication architecture.
Specifically, we introduce three novel SDN deployment scenarios in local networks of
Smart Grid. Moreover, we also investigate the pertinent security aspects with each
deployment scenario along with possible solutions. On the other hand, we conducted
experiments by using actual Smart Grid communication data to assess the recovery
performance of the proposed SDN-based system. The results show that SDN is a
viable technology for the Smart Grid communications with almost negligible delays
in switching to backup wireless links.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of smart devices with their ability to access the Internet created
new avenues to build large-scale cyber-phsycial systems. This, however, poses new
challenges for not only keeping up with the dynamicity of the hardware and software,
but also with the resilient and reliable data collection in such systems. The emerging
software defined networking (SDN) paradigm can perfectly address these challenges
by splitting controls of networks and data flow operations [HHB14]. One of the
major goals in SDN is to be able to interact with the networking equipment (e.g.,
routers, switches) to create an open networking architecture for everyone. In this
way, one can get a global view of the entire network and will be able to make global
changes without having to access to each device’s unique hardware. Eventually,
various large-scale network architectures can be deployed and maintained with ease
while still featuring resiliency and robustness.
In parallel with the advances in SDN technology, the existing power grid in the
US is also going through a massive transformation to make it smarter (i.e., Smart
Grid), which will be more reliable and connected with the ability to transfer data
and power in two-ways [SAU12]. The need for data communication in the power grid
necessitated upgrading the existing grid network infrastructure with different com-
ponents such as home area networks (HANs), neighborhood area networks (NANs)
and wide-area networks (WANs). In this way, a number of different applications
such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Demand Response, Wide Area
Situational Awareness, and green energy-based micro grids can be realized [SAU12].
Each of these Smart Grid applications deploys thousands of network devices that
need to be managed continuously for reliable operations. Unfortunately, the man-
agement of this massive infrastructure requires additional labor and cost for the
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utility companies who own these networks. Although minimizing the management
cost is one of the goals of the utilities, this cost will always be relevant as long as
the customers are served.
One sustainable solution to this network management problem is the use of the
emerging SDN, which can provide excellent opportunities for reducing the network
management cost by integrating a software-based control that can be flexible with
respect to software upgrades, flow-control, security patching, and quality of service
(QoS) [CHHK13]. Nonetheless, while a significant amount of work has been done in
the SDN space, most of these efforts targeted the applications in the area of cloud
computing, data centers, and virtualization [HHB14] and there is a need to adapt
SDN for the existing needs of Smart Grid applications.
In this thesis, we both summarize and promote the use of SDN for various ap-
plications in the Smart Grid. Specifically, we target three different Smart Grid
applications that heavily depend on the underlying infrastructure. 1)AMI appli-
cations, where meter data are collected via a mesh network that consists of smart
meters and relays. Each of these equipment will have the ability to route the me-
ter data through their routing tables. 2) Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) Systems, which connects field devices such as relays, IEDs, PLCs, and
PMUs with the utility control center. The control center is typically equipped with
routers and switches just like a data center. 3) Microgrid Systems, which integrates
distributed power resources with the Smart Grid. The control and monitoring of
these networks require the deployment of network devices for collecting data about
them.
We explain how SDN can be utilized in these applications. Then, we articu-
late potential security threats that can arise as a result of deploying SDN in these
applications and suggest solutions to alleviate the threats. Applying the maturing
2
SDN technology into the smart grid infrastructure presents ample unique research
challenges in security and networking to engineers and scientists. This book chapter
will be exploring those challenges within a SDN-enabled smart grid infrastructure.
In addition, the data communication motivation necessitates upgrading the ex-
isting network infrastructure with different components. With these new trans-
formations, Smart Grid systems will need to maintain a large-scale heterogeneous
network that brings a number of challenges. One of the challenge is the ability of
this networking infrastructure to self-heal itself during man-made or natural (e.g.,
hurricane, earthquake) disasters so that potential blackouts and temporary outages
can be minimized. In particular, since the underlying communication medium for
most of the current substation-to-substation links is based on power-line communi-
cations (PLC) technology, they can be easily damaged during catastrophes which
results in load imbalance and eventually blackouts. Through continuous interac-
tions between different components of the smart grid, the new energy infrastructure
should reconfigure the control of the physical assets and network topology in an
efficient manner and achieve resilient operations.
Each of these networks deploy thousands of network devices that need to be
managed continuously. Unfortunately, this massive infrastructure requires addi-
tional labor and cost for the utility companies who own these networks. Although
minimizing the management cost is one of the goals of the utilities, this cost will
always be relevant as long as the customers are served. In fact, the emerging SDN
paradigm can provide excellent opportunity for reducing the network management
cost by integrating a software-based control that can be flexible with respect to
software upgrades, flow-control, security patching, and quality of service (QoS).
Self-healing in such unfortunate situations requires a comprehensive coordination
among the components of the Smart Grid and needs to rely on the availability of
3
backup or redundant links/paths and devices. In this regard, we propose using
SDN to enable interaction with the valuable networking equipment and assets by
leveraging SDN’s unique ability to maintain a global view of the Smart Grid. Note
that while a significant amount of work has been done in the SDN space, most of
these efforts targeted the applications in the area of cloud computing, data centers
and virtualization [HHB14]. Thus, there is a need to adapt SDN for various Smart
Grid resiliency applications and to the best of our knowledge SDN is considered for
the first time in the Smart Grid settings.
4
CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 SDN
Switches in traditional networks enable the data flow without causing packets to
wait for another even though the packets might arrive at similar times. Local Area
Network (LAN) switches are based on the idea of packet switching. In this method,
incoming packets are saved to temporary memory, MAC address contained in frame’s
header is read and compared to list of addresses in the switch lookup table. There
are 3 different configuration ways:
• Shared memory : It stores all packets arriving in a common memory buffer
shared by all the switch ports, then sends them out via the correct port for
the destination node.
• Matrix : This has an internal grid with the input ports and the output ports
crossing each other. When a packet is detected on an input port, the MAC
address is compared to the lookup table to find the appropriate output port.
The switch makes a connection on the grid where these two ports intersect.
• Bus architecture: Instead of a grid, an internal transmission path (common
bus) is shared by all of the ports using Time division multiple access(TDMA).
When a new networking device joins the network, it will broadcast its informa-
tion to let others know about its existence. Switches will pass that information to
all other segments in their broadcast domain. For routers, this process is similar
except that it occurs at the IP layer and thus uses IP addresses instead of MAC
addresses used by switches. The routing tables are used for checking the incoming
IP addresses.
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In both cases, there is a lookup table for the incoming packets inside the devices.
These tables can only be changed by the devices based on the changes in the network.
Each device’s lookup table is solely controlled by that device not through any other
centralized mechanism. SDN’s main motivation is to move the control of the lookup
tables that are inside the network devices to a separate location so that they can be
controlled more easily.
Specifically, this can be described as separation of the packet forwarding and the
way how the forwarding tables are created and changed. These two processes are as-
sumed to be on separate layers, which are referred to as data plane and control plane
in SDN technology: Control Plane is also referred to as Network Operating System
(NOS). This plane is supposed to supply network decisions for packet forwarding or
dropping. On the other hand, data plane is responsible for data forwarding. SDN
focuses on flow forwarding idea instead of dealing with IP or MAC-address based
forwarding.
Main problem in the traditional networks was updating the network elements,
which requires too much effort and time [HHB14]. By creating a programming
interface to be able to update network elements from a center (i.e., at the control
plane) via SDN, such complexity in network management can be eliminated. An
illustration of how SDN reorganizes the network architecture with respect to the
current ones are is illustrated in Fig. 2.1. As can be seen from this figure, the
control plane is typically controlled by a single center through some applications.
However, this is not the only way to implement the control. The control can
also be distributed to many other centers which will bring some overheads in terms
of performance and reliability. Further information about the comparison of these
approaches can be found in [ZWHJ14]. SDN enables innovation on network and
each TCP/IP layer might have an independent innovation. The SDN-enabled net-
6
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Figure 2.1: Current (a) vs SDN-based (b) Networks
works become more flexible and accessible networks with software interfaces making
it very convenient for network management. SDN can provide more fine-grained
control on traffic compared to traditional networks. It gives the network admin-
istrators the ability to arbitrarily change routing tables on routers without having
to deal with each of the routers individually. It also provides the ability to setup
new services through virtualization. Finally, it provides better and more granular
security through the availability of the control plane. For instance, each user can
have different abilities provided by the network to control their firewalls.
Today, SDN is used for a variety of networking settings. For instance, it is
used in cloud computing and data centers for ease of network management and
control of virtual machines (VMs) [MVKK12]. It can connect multiple data center
networks by eliminating the problems of proprietary architectures. In this way, the
workload can move from one network to another to save time and energy. This
idea of workload oﬄoading can also be used for mobile devices which needs more
powerful machines with certain security requirements [BAH+12]. Finally, SDN can
be used for Internet research for testing certain ideas without changing the current
network [dOSdSPRK12].
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2.1.1 SDN Controller
SDN Controller is the main part of SDN-based systems. It has the functionality
part and can be considered as brain of a system. SDN Controller receives the data
from switches in the network, and decides and responds back by considering the
packet information. SDN Controller may drop the packet, create a rule and assign
it to the switch etc.
SDN Controller should have two interfaces; one of them to communicate with
user applications, and the other one to communicate with SDN switches. First of
them called Northbound API. This API provides a developer to update the network
elements from distant point. It could be done with a few ways including the REST
calls, which is basically sending queries to a specific web URL (web link), and get
responds from them. That respond can be used for such purposes. Second interface
is the one sending rules to SDN switches from SDN Controller. Most common
protocol for Southbound API is called OpenFlow.
There are lots of SDN Controller in the market. We have decided to use Open-
DayLight SDN Controller since it is open-source and easy to install [ope]. It also
provides REST interface to communicate with SDN Controller from our own appli-
cations.
2.1.2 OpenFlow
SDN requires some protocols for the control plane to communicate with the data
plane. One of such protocols is OpenFlow [ope]. OpenFlow is the first standard
communications interface defined between the control and forwarding layers of an
SDN architecture. It allows direct access to and manipulation of the forwarding
plane of network devices such as switches and routers, both physical and virtual. In
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other words, it is a communication protocol proposed for supplying communication
between routers and network switches (data plane) to routing decision center (con-
trol plane). It simply gives programmer control over routing protocol of routers.
Figure 2.2 shows OpenFlow protocol stands.
2.2 Mininet
Mininet is a network emulator. It is open-source and implemented with Python
programming language, and can be expanded. It is the most popular emulator for
OpenFlow based network environments. It supports OpenFlow protocol for every
nodes, either switch or host, by default. It implements real behavior of network
devices and gives an easy way to get and use correct system behavior. It is so
simple to experiment with different topologies as well.
Mininet networks run real standard Unix/Linux code network stack at its own
nodes. Because of this, the code can be moved to a real system with a few changes,
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for real-world testing, performance evaluation, and deployment [min]. In addition,
Mininet can work with any SDN Controller.
2.3 Smart Grid
Smart Grid is uses analog or digital information and communication technology to
collect data from the Power Grid and behave according to that data in an auto-
mated way to increase the efficiency, reliability, economics, and sustainability of the
production and distribution of electricity. Smart Grid has a large-scale communi-
cation network that consists of Home Area Networks (HANs), Neighborhood Area
Networks (NANs) and Wide Are Networks (WANs). Each of these network com-
ponents deploy thousands of devices such as Intelligent Electronic Devices, Phasor
Measurement Units (PMUs), routers, switches and computers. In addition, these
network employ different underlying technologies whether it be wired or wireless
along with various communication protocols. This brings up the problems of inter-
operability as well as network management.
10
CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK
The use of SDN in Smart Grid applications has just started to be considered
recently [ZSLF13a]. In general, SDN has been employed for various purposes: re-
silience, network management, security and quality of service (QoS). For instance,
one of the recent works proposed using SDN to support multi-rate multicasting for
PMU data collection assuming the availability of wireless PMUs [Mil10] within an
SDN architecture [GKRC13]. Since SDN controller has a global view of the network,
it can provide efficient routes that can match the performance of the existing ap-
proaches with commodity switches. In addition to this work, [SNS+13] studied SDN
usage for QoS in wide are networks for Smart Grid and compared the performance
with MPLS technology. Different from this work, we study the performance of an
SDN-enabled system in a IEC 61850 application as opposed to PMUs. In addition,
our main goal is not to provide QoS, rather to test resilience capability during link
failures.
Another recent work is on substation automation and virtualization using SDN
[CHHK13]. The authors provided advantages of deploying SDN in a substation
network in term of management and then tested its feasibility in Mininet with 3
switches. Compared to traditional Ethernet switches, they observed that the la-
tency of data coming from IEDs is much less. However, in that work, there is no
quantitative experimentation and the work is mostly dedicated to potential ideas
with SDN. Our work, on the other hand, provides extensive experimentation in
case of link failures and involves ns-3 for fine-grained result collection using real
IEC 61850 MMS data. Moreover, [GdSDKAW+15] tested multi-path routing for
eavesdropping services in a SCADA network of substations using Modbus data for
routing. While we also follow the idea of redundancy, we achieve it at the link
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level with wireless complementary links. Finally, in [DKG+14], the work consid-
ers both resilience and QoS for Smart Grid applications when SDN is employed.
Specifically, they considered the performance at the transmission and distribution
networks focusing on MMS and GOOSE protocols. The tests were carried out on
an actual testbed of OpenFlow switches. They studies the recovery delay when one
of the links were removed manually. We follow a similar setup for link failure, but
as opposed to this work, our goal is to assess the effectiveness of redundant wireless
links.
12
CHAPTER 4
SECURE SDN ARCHITECTURES FOR THE SMART GRID
4.1 Integration of SDN with The Smart Grid
In this section, we first explain the communication infrastructure for Smart Grid
and then detail the applications that can benefit from the use of SDN.
4.1.1 Smart Grid Networking Architectures
Before moving into the description of how SDN can be used for Smart Grid ap-
plications, we first briefly explain the existing Smart Grid network infrastructure.
Basically, there are three major components in a Smart Grid infrastructure [SAU12]:
1) HANs that mainly connect home devices with the smart meters; 2) NANs which
collect smart meter data from houses; and 3) WANs which provide long-haul com-
munication with the utility control centers using various technologies including cel-
lular ones. A typical Smart Grid networking infrastructure showing possible infras-
tructure for generation, transmission, and distribution components of power grid
is depicted in Fig. 4.1 redrawn from [SAU12]. Under this infrastructure, many
applications could run simultaneously. In this work, we focus on three different
applications that utilize this networking infrastructure at different levels as will be
discussed shortly.
4.1.2 Motivation for SDN-Enabled Smart Grid
Utilities and energy companies own and operate network components that are part
of the Smart Grid communication infrastructure. In some cases, they also lease
services from telecommunication companies or third party cloud services. In any
13
Figure 4.1: Smart Grid multi-tier communication network.
case, the management of the networks is a great challenge due to the scale. Further-
more, due to using different vendors and applications, the equipments may not be
interoperable. Therefore, the utilities will need to deal with equipment maintenance
and software upgrades that brings a lot of burden in terms of cost and labor. The
following reasons necessitate a more flexible network management technology based
on SDN:
• Software upgrades are also challenging in a large-scale network.
• Regulatory compliance in the security area also requires a form of software
update in a fast fashion.
• Mergers and acquisitions of businesses which causes the task of merging mul-
tiple networks or seamlessly integrating one into the other.
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• New equipment and improved technology necessitates replacing the software
without any disruption to the existing older equipment.
• Peering arrangements with the regulatory and government agencies
SDN seems to be a promising solution for the aforementioned problems due to
following advantages it brings:
• SDN provides a global end-to-end view of the network which make the large-
scale management more effective.
• SDN adopts open standards and introduces technology abstraction, which
provides a vendor-agnostic approach to configuring and maintaining various
types of network elements that are common in Smart Grid.
• Hardware virtualization through SDN eases the burden of managing different
networks while using resources efficiently.
• Due to its holistic view of network, the SDN-based network will provide su-
perior control of delay and jitter in the network which is crucial for SCADA
systems in terms of state estimation and control.
• SDN’s bandwidth-on-demand capabilities will also create opportunities to in-
crease revenue through accelerated service velocity in cases where the utility
also serves as a communication service provider in the coverage area. More
and more utility companies are functioning as service providers in rural areas.
4.1.3 SDN-enabled NANs
Smart Grid’s NAN is mainly used for AMI applications. While there has been some
wired options for building these communications, recent implementations solely
targeted wireless solutions that depended on different standards such as IEEE
15
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Figure 4.2: SDN for Smart Grid NANs [SAU12]
802.15.4g, IEEE 802.11s, RF-Mesh, and other proprietary mesh networks [SAU12].
As long as different vendors’ products support OpenFlow, a NAN using a mixture of
these standards can be easily controlled and re-tasked through a standard network
control script programming.
In most cases, Smart Grid operators prefer exchanging the information among
different NANs in order to get a better load state estimation. Therefore, being able
to control such a network in a centralized manner for load balancing, security and
QoS services is very valuable. While SDN can provide this novelty, there are still
challenges that would require some research to enable the use of SDN in wireless
environments.
One of these challenges is the performance of the centralized control. As opposed
to wired networking interface among the controller and SDN switches, this will not
be the case in wireless-mesh based NANs due to the scalability of the AMI. There-
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fore, the control will be through wireless communication and most probably using
multi-hopping (see Fig. 4.2). If the same channel is used for data communications,
then this may create a lot of interference. While some of the very recent works
investigated this issue for wireless mesh networks using [NMG+14], these works do
not directly apply to AMI NANs where the scale is larger and the variety of nodes
is significant in terms of used hardware/software. This suggests investigating the
feasibility of distributed control in SDN-based NANs [DKB11].
4.1.4 SDN-enabled SCADA
SCADA systems were designed to collect data from field devices such as PLCs,
PMUs, IEDs at substations in real-time and do control decision at the control cen-
ter in terms of reliability and quality of the power [BDD+10]. A substation contains
hundreds of different IEDs, each generating and/or consuming information about
the status of some aspect of the substation. A standard called IEC 61850 is also
used for substation automation [BDD+10]. Currently, these systems are not only
scalable, but also their sensing coverage is very limited. Proper configuration and
maintenance of IED communication requires significant effort. The network com-
plexity further increases with the uses of other protocols.
However, with the modernization of the power grid, there will be opportunities to
upgrade these systems based on a mix of wireless and wired infrastructure through
the deployment of a large number of modern PMUs. For instance, the design and
use of wireless PMUs have already begun [Mil10]. One of the recent works proposed
using these wireless PMUs within an SDN architecture so that the network admin-
istrator would have a global view of the power grid computer network, which makes
it is easier to manage PMU telemetry traffic compared to a traditional IP network
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Figure 4.3: SDN for SCADA networks
[GKRC13].
There are also opportunities to reorganize the elements of these SCADA sys-
tems especially in terms of exploiting efficient ways to eliminate the complexities
of multicasting and broadcasting. Massive amount of data is transmitted through
these broadcasts or multicasts. Current architecture is a centralized one with hub-
and-spoke model which is inadequate to address too many broadcasts or multicasts.
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Researchers strived to address this issue by using middleware approaches in the past
[GBHB09]. The idea in these approaches are to implement publish and subscribe
mechanisms where the data sources publish data and the brokers in the middle-
ware (at the application layer) are responsible for delivering this data to subscribers
within their QoS requirements. This is in a way a sort of group communications
among publishers and subscribers. However, since this was implemented at the
application layer, it is not only slower, but also not flexible in terms of hardware
requirements. SDN can be used to redesign this middleware by including the control
plane in the middleware, but at the network layer [ZSLF13b].
Another advantage of such an SDN-based control is the ability to perform traffic
engineering, which cannot be done with layer-2 switches using spanning tree-based
routing [ALW+14]. SDN can replace MPLS-based systems for meeting QoS require-
ments of data coming from PMUs and IEDs as shown in Fig. 4.3. For instance,
the work in [SNS+13] has explored a simulation-based study of using SDN in inter-
substation networks from the perspective of substation failures.
4.1.5 SDN-enabled Microgrid
A microgrid is a miniaturized version of power grid which can supply electrical load
of small communities such as university campuses, malls, camps etc. It includes
numerous Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) (e.g., photovoltaic (PV) systems,
micro-combined heat and power systems (µCHP), and electric vehicles (EVs)), load,
storage, and protection devices that are controlled by a central controller. Microgrids
are becoming viable options for saving energy and generating clean power along with
their reliable electrical services. For instance, University of California San Diego had
setup a micro grid for its own campus which saved them $850,000 a month [UCS].
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The major issue with these microgrids is the risk of rapid changes that may
cause instability and eventually collapse in the system. Therefore, it is crucial to
perform fine-grained real-time monitoring and control. This can only be achieved via
reliable communications that can provide QoS in support of low data latency, packet
prioritization and traffic engineering. These features can be supported via the SDN
technology to stabilize and optimize system operation. Another opportunity for the
use of SDN in microgrids is on the problem of DER management and aggregation.
Basically, the DERs are grouped together for different purposes and any mobility
related group changes will affect the system. Currently, this management is done at
the application layer. The complexity can be reduced by exploiting SDN capabilities
that will be implemented at the network layer [ZSLF13b].
But network devices are ideally suited for being powered by micro grids that
use renewable energy. Most network devices have various power modes, battery
backup and can re-route traffic based on availability of power. They have a lot more
intelligence than most devices connected to the power grid to enable smart power
management.
4.2 Introduction to SDN Security
SDNs have potential to offer greater security by providing consistent access control,
ability to apply security policies efficiently and effectively, and the ability to centrally
manage and control network topology. However, SDN networks introduce some new
security vulnerabilities on their own. These vulnerabilities are related to single point
of failure in the SDN controller, potential to cause congestion in communications
between data and control places. In the following, we summarize the existing works
that studied SDN security.
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Klinger et al., performed security analysis of three major SDN architectures,
namely the Path Computation Element (PCE), 4D, and the Secure Architecture for
the Network Enterprise (SANE) [KKMB14]. They use Microsoft threat modeling
technique based on the STRIDE model which categorizes threats into six categories,
namely Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service,
and Elevation of privilege. STRIDE analysis of PCE revealed several vulnerabilities
like tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service. On the other hand,
the 4D architecture does not provide any mechanism to prevent against tampering,
information disclosure, or denial or service threats. In the security analysis it was
found that processes in SANE architecture are the weakest link in the security chain.
They are susceptible to spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure,
DoS, and elevation of privilege.
Researchers have also investigated potential for attacking the OpenFlow frame-
work using DoS attacks [SG13]. For instance, one of the attacks known as the
control plane saturation attack attempts to saturate the communications between
the control and data planes in the OpenFlow network. If an adversary sends a
large number of packets with no matching rules, it can saturate the communication
between the switch and the controller resulting in a DoS attack. Shin et al. pro-
posed a solution to this attack by introducing some intelligence in the data plane to
distinguish between sources that will complete a TCP session with those that will
not [SG13]. The second challenge that is studied by them is the issue of monitoring
and controlling flow dynamics. Inability to monitor and control flow dynamics is a
big weakness that results in the inability to detect and respond to DoS attacks. The
authors propose a method called actuating triggers where control layer applications
send alert signals when there are changes in the flow dynamics.
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Shin et al., also proposed a variant of the saturating attack to launch a DoS
attack on SDN networks by fingerprinting the network [SYPG13]. In this attack,
an adversary sends packets for new and existing flows and measures their response
times. The response times will tell the attacker whether the target network is using
SDN or not. The attacker can then launch the resource consumption attacks.
4.3 Security of SDN-Enabled Smart Grid
In this section, we discuss the security of the SDN-enabled smart grid. First, we
articulate the threat model, then we list the desired security services for the SDN-
enabled smart grid.
4.3.1 Threat Model
Conceptually, the threats to the SDN-enabled smart grid could be listed from four
different complementary perspectives: (1) Method-specific; (2) target-specific; (3)
software-specific; and (4) identity-specific.
Method-specific threats define how the threats are executed. The method-
specific threats can be either passive or active. In the passive method, the attacker
only monitors (or eavesdrops), records the communication data occurring in the
SDN-enabled smart grid, and analyzes the collected data to gain meaningful infor-
mation. In the active one, the attacker tries to send fake authentication messages,
malformed packets, or replay a past communication to the components of the the
SDN-enabled smart grid. As passive threats are surreptitious, it is harder to catch
their existence. However, it is easier to catch the existence of an active attacker,
but its damage to the smart grid can be relatively higher than the passive threats.
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Figure 4.4: A threat model for the SDN-enabled smart grid
Target-specific threats classify the attacks according to which device the threats
target. In an SDN-enabled smart grid, any device such as IEDs, PMUs, PLCs, Smart
Meters could be valuable targets for potential malicious activities. In software-
specific threats, the attackers aim to exploit the vulnerabilities associated with the
networking protocols, software suits (IEC 61850, IEEE C37.118 Syncrophasor Pro-
tocol, Openflow of SDN) that run in the smart grid. Finally, depending on the
identity of the attacker, i.e., whether an attacker is a legitimate member of the net-
work during an attack or not, she can be defined as insider or outsider attacker.
Insiders are more dangerous than the outsiders as they have more knowledge about
the internal architecture of the SDN-enabled smart grid.
In reality, there is no hard line between these attacking models and they com-
plement each other because an insider could be a passive attacker trying to exploit
IEC 61850 on an IED in the SDN-enabled smart grid. The threat model for the
SDN-enabled smart grid is presented in Fig. 4.4.
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4.3.2 Desired Security Mechanisms
Desired security mechanisms are usually defined by the national and international
standardization bodies (e.g., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Inter-
national Telecommunication Union (ITU)) and are used by many researchers and
practitioners who aim to develop secure systems. In this sub-section, we use the
security architecture suggested by the ITU’s Recommendation X.800 [X.891] doc-
umentation, which is referred to as the Security Architecture for Open Systems
Interconnect (OSI) as our guideline in addressing the threats discussed in the pre-
vious sub-section.
Confidentiality : Confidentiality refers to the protection of the exchanged content
(e.g., gathered data, reports, commands) among the components of the smart grid
such as IEDs, PMUs, PLCs, Smart Meters. A malicious entity which has the priv-
ilege to access the content, should not be able to decode the exchanged messages
in the network. Confidentially also entails the protection against any unintended
information leakage from the applications, controllers, and devices within the SDN-
enabled smart grid. This is particularly important because the data generated and
collected by the smart grid equipment, e.g., PMUs, IEDs are very periodic in its na-
ture. Data forwarding policies or flow rules associated with the collected data may
be discovered with simple timing or side-channel analysis. Similarly, an increased
delay for the establishment of a new flow rule in response to an incoming packet can
inform a potential attacker about the behavior of the OpenFlow controller within
the SDN-enabled smart grid. This unintended information disclosure from data
plane devices, applications, flows, controllers should also be considered as part of
any confidentiality service.
Traditionally, confidentiality can be provided by adopting either symmetric and
asymmetric key-based encryption schemes [SB15]. In symmetric encryption, one
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key is utilized among the PMUs, PLCs, smart meters, IEDs, applications, flows,
network controllers. Examples of symmetric encryption that can be utilized for the
smart grid include AES, RC4. On the other hand, in asymmetric encryption, a
pair of two keys (aka public and private) are utilized among the communicating
components of the smart grid. RSA and ECC are the two most important examples
of asymmetric encryption that could be deployed. Moreover, the maturing state-
of-the art encryption mechanisms based on fully-homomorphic-encryption could be
utilized for specifically preserving the privacy of the flows.
Authentication: Authentication involves guaranteeing the genuineness of the
communication among the devices in the data plane, controllers, and the appli-
cations. An authentication mechanism verifies if the exchanged information stems
from the legitimate participants of the SDN-enabled smart grid because a malicious
entity (e.g., a compromised IED) may be able to inject counterfeit content or resend
the same content into the SDN-enabled smart grid. More specifically, an adversarial
smart grid application may attempt to insert new flow rules that may circumvent
flow rules imposed by other applications [SHOS13]. Adversaries may also insert new
rules to damage the system by influencing the state estimation, which is crucial to
evaluate the demand.
Authentication can fundamentally be provided based on three factors [SB15]: (1)
Knowledge factor : the proof of the knowledge of some secret (e.g., passwords) is pro-
vided to the authenticator. Symmetric, asymmetric key-based encryption schemes
and hashing algorithms can all be utilized as part of the authentication mechanism
with the knowledge factor. (2) Possession factor : authenticator verifies the claimant
using the credentials provided by a specialized hardware. Electronic cards, smart
cards, smart tokens physically owned by the claimant can be utilized and integrated
with the SDN-enabled smart grid devices and applications. (3) Identity factor : the
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authenticator utilizes features uniquely identifying in the verification of the claimant.
Both static or dynamic patterns that can identify the devices and applications can
be utilized. For instance, behavioral information from the SDN-enabled smart grid
devices and applications such as communication patterns, timing patterns, delays
can all be utilized [LUB14] as part of this authentication method. Within the SDN-
enabled smart grid, all of these authentication techniques can be individually or a
combination of one or more of the techniques could be adopted. If more than one
factor is utilized, the authentication is called multi-factor authentication.
Integrity : Integrity refers to the capability to detect if the exchanged content
between the communicating devices of the smart grid have been altered or not.
Furthermore, the integrity service involves ensuring that the exchanged content is
not deleted, replication of old data, counterfeit, or stale because the nature of the
messages in the smart grid is very time-sensitive. Within the SDN-enabled smart
grid, modification of the flow rules or insertion of new Openflow rules [KKS13] by
adversaries can cause severe damage to the healthy operations of the smart grid.
Integrity is usually provided by appending the cryptographic digest of the mes-
sage content to the message itself [SB15]. When the PMUs, PLCs, smart meters,
IEDs, applications, network controllers receive the message, they can check to see
if the digest of the content matches the digest they computes on their end. If the
digests match each other, then the message is deemed legitimate and not to have
changed from its original content. Content digests in integrity are usually created
with the usage of hashing algorithms. There are several hashing algorithms such
(e.g., MD5, SHA-2) in use today, which do not require the presence of keys unless
they are specifically designed to work with keys like keyed-hashing (e.g., HMAC,
CMAC). Alternatively, integrity can be provided as part of a digital authentica-
tion mechanism utilizing symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques. For
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instance, the last block of the encrypted data in AES can be appended to the mes-
sage that would be sent as the integrity code. In a similar fashion, a private key in
the asymmetric encryption techniques (e.g., RSA, ECC) can be used to provide the
integrity code appended to the message.
Access Control : With access control, unauthorized use of a resource in the SDN-
enabled smart grid is prevented. Access control addresses which participant of the
smart grid reaches which content or service. For instance, IEDs should not be
allowed to have the privileges of PMUs. Proper security measures must prevent
any unauthorized SDN controller access. An unauthenticated application might
try to access to resources for which it does not have exclusive privileges. Or, an
authenticated application, IEDs, PMUs, PLCs, and Smart Meters may abuse its
privileges.
Access control is usually achieved through four different methods [SB15]: (1)
discretionary access control (DAC); (2) mandatory access control (MAC); (3) role-
based access control (RBAC); and (4) attribute-based access control (ABAC). In
DAC, access control decisions are made based on the exclusive rights that are set
for the flows, applications, IEDs, PMUs, PLCs, and Smart Meters. An entity in
DAC can enable another entity for accessing resources. In MAC, access control
function considers the criticality of the resources and the rights of the flows, ap-
plications, IEDs, PMUs, PLCs, and Smart Meters on the resources. In MAC, an
entity can not enable another entity for accessing the resources. In RBAC, access
control decisions are based on the roles created within the the SDN-enabled smart
grid. A role can include more than one entity e.g., the flows, IEDs. Moreover, a
role defines the capabilities what the entities can do or not do within a certain role.
Finally, in ABAC, the access control decisions are based on the features of the flows,
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applications, IEDs, PMUs, PLCs, and Smart Meters, resources to be accessed, and
environmental conditions.
Availability : Due to the threats to SDN-enabled smart grid, some portion of
the grid or some of the functionalities or services provided by the grid could be
damaged and unavailable to the participants of the grid. For instance, some PLCs
could be compromised and they could cease functioning. A Denial-of-Service (DoS)
type attack [SAB14] can overflow the communication link of the SDN controller-
switch [SHOS13]. SDN flow switch tables can be flooded by fake entries. In a similar
fashion, a centralized SDN controller can be a single point of failure. Moreover,
recent technological advances enabled the integration of the wireless technologies
(e.g., ) into the smart grid infrastructure. In such cases, adversaries may jam the
wireless medium, effectively hampering all the communications. Thus, availability
service ensures that the necessary functionalities or the services provided by the
SDN-enabled smart grid are always carried out, even in the case of attacks.
Usually, the smart grid includes redundant components in their infrastructure.
This is to ensure the continuous operation during failures. In a similar fashion,
the SDN-enabled smart grid can be designed with such redundancy to achieve the
availability service.
Accountability : With accountability (aka non-repudiation [Sta03]), the SDN-
enabled smart grid ensures that a device or a software component (e.g., applications,
IEDs, PMUs, PLCs, and Smart Meters) can not refute the reception of a message
from the other device or application or the sent of a message to the other device or
application in the communication.
Accountability can be provided as a service bundled inside authentication and
integrity. For instance, a digital signature scheme (DSS) [Sta03], which is based
on utilizing encryption methods would address accountability. Additionally, proper
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auditing mechanisms and logs should be utilized to provide accountability in the
SDN-enabled smart grid.
4.3.3 Specific Security Problems for SDN-Enabled Smart
Grid
With respect to the three examples we have provided where SDN can be applied,
specific security concerns may arise. In the following, we discsuss these issues and
possible problems to address these.
• Security of OpenFlow Protocol : In all cases, the security of the communica-
tion among the switches and control plane will be through OpenFlow proto-
col. This can be either via a wireless or wired connection. Obviously, the
main security issues will be related to authentication and integrity of these
communications. For instance, an adversarial Smart Grid application may
attempt to insert new flow rules that may circumvent flow rules imposed by
other applications. They may also insert new rules to damage the system by
influencing the state estimation.
• Information Disclosure: This arises from timing analysis and can reveal cer-
tain aspects of a network’s state as well as a controller’s strategy to an attacker.
Mitigation in this context means ensuring that the observable system parame-
ters do not expose the internal system state. For example, the increased delay
for the establishment of a new flow rule in response to an incoming packet can
inform the attacker about the behavior of the OpenFlow controller.
• Single central controller can be single point of failure. Also a problem of
fault-tolerance and scalability.
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• Upper level protocols communication with the controller. Possible compro-
mise.
• DoS on the controller-switch communication or on the network.
4.4 Security of SDN over Smart-Grid
Security: Link isolation is a critical requirement of the substation network not only
for superfluous traffic congestion on IED network interfaces, but also for security
and access issues within the operating environment. IED configuration is commonly
carried out live when other devices on the substation network are performing mon-
itoring and control of the substation. The risk of a malicious attack, masked as a
live-reconfiguration event, is an attack vector that could be mitigated with a higher
degree of network-level security. The SDN-enabled substation network controller
has the capacity to support more security at the controller level. The nature of the
software-defined controller also allows for greater flexibility in security policies and
access control between connected IEDs. A group of devices that are linked through
a message group can be enabled for one-way communication and only allow the au-
thorized publisher to send traffic into the network. This addresses a common hole
in substation network security.
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CHAPTER 5
SDN FOR RESILIENT COMMUNICATIONS IN SMART GRID
ACTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
5.1 SDN-Based Inter-Substation Network
5.1.1 Proposed Model
We propose an SDN-based communication infrastructure that can be deployed both
within and among the substations as shown in Fig. 5.1. Specifically, each substation
can maintain an SDN gateway switch, which can be controlled by a global SDN con-
troller that is located at the Utility Controls Center. The global SDN controller can
maintain the traffic among the substations (e.g., IEC 61850 MMS traffic) by insert-
ing the flow rules in the table. The regular communication with the gateway can be
achieved through a control line or the existing data network, typically wired. The
gateways at the substations can also be part of the local area network (LAN) within
the substation and thus we also introduce a local SDN controller for controlling the
traffic within this substation LAN.
In this way, the flow table in the gateway can be accessible by multiple controllers,
but the scope of these controllers will be different. While the global SDN controller
will adjust the inter-substation communications, the local SDN controller focuses
on the interior traffic in a substation. The connection between two substations are
based on redundant links as will be detailed next.
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Figure 5.1: Proposed SDN model for substation communications
5.1.2 Mininet Setup and Integration of ns-3 with Mininet
Note that extensive performance evaluation of the proposed SDN-enabled architec-
ture is not possible in a real substation network since access to these facilities is not
always possible. In addition, since these systems are typically large-scale and spans
different geographical regions, setting up small prototypes in a lab environment for
testing purposes will not be adequate to do various evaluations even though the cost
can be covered. Therefore, research mostly rely on emulators that are freely avail-
able. For SDN, Mininet [LHM10] has been evolved as one of the most widely used
tool based on the Linux protocol stack. It is open source and has been implemented
on Python. Mininet nodes come with Openflow protocol support. It has an abil-
ity to work with internal SDN controller as default, as well as external controllers
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such as OpenDayLight, NOX. While it can produce various virtual nodes in a single
computer environment, Mininet can only mimic the behavior of protocols that are
available at the Linux protocol stack.
For this, we propose extending Mininet [LHM10] topology capabilities in terms
of supporting redundant and heterogeneous links using network function virtualiza-
tion (NFV). Specifically, we propose hosting virtual interfaces on top of the wired
physical interface for making connections to: 1) SDN controller using a separate
wired connection; 2) Utility control center using wired PLC connection; and 3)
Other substations for exchanging IEC 61850 MMS data through wired PLC. We
also add a wireless connection by introducing a new wireless interface for the switch
that acts as the gateway for the substation. This wireless connection will be using
MMS protocol for communication with the other substations. The underlying pro-
tocols can be either IEEE 802.11n-based for shorter distances or IEEE 802.11ah or
LTE for longer distances. Within the substation, there can be various other link
layer protocols. All these interfaces are shown in Fig. 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Proposed connection of two substations over WAN.
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Nonetheless, there are a many wired/wireless protocols that are employed in
SCADA systems, AMI and substation automation in Smart Grid, which cannot be
implemented and tested under Mininet. This not only limits the research capabilities
regarding SDN deployments but also is not flexible in terms of testing network
resilience, fault-tolerance, real-time behavior and security at the nodes when SDN
is deployed. Therefore, there is a great need to integrate Mininet with one of the
existing network simulators for comprehensively evaluating the effectiveness of SDN-
based control on the Smart Grid communication networks.
The proposed integration model is shown in Fig. 5.3. As can be seen, we
propose using Tapbridge object in ns-3, which effectively allows host systems and
virtual machines running native applications and protocol stacks to integrate with
an ns-3 simulation. In our case, ns-3 connects to a Virtual TAP Device interface
created on Mininet. Packets sent by Mininet host to the Virtual TAP Device are
transmitted through a file descriptor to the ns-3 process. Next they are forwarded
down by Tapbridge to the ns-3 Net Device and transmitted over the ns-3 emulated
channel. This allows us to analyze the behavior of native protocol suites (such as
802.11, LTE etc) in large-scale networks that may not be supported by Mininet.
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Figure 5.3: Modeling channels in Mininet using ns-3 features.
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5.2 Experimental Evaluation
5.2.1 Experiment Setup
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed work, we utilized Mininet as
mentioned before for the Openflow protocol from the SDN controller to switches
and used OpenDayLight SDN controller. Network topologies were created with
Mininet and were integrated with ns-3 links as explained in the previous section.
To generate the IEC 61850 MMS traffic, we used IEC 61850 based industrial feeder
relays from the FIU Smart Grid Testbed. MMS is a data generation model based
on publisher-subscriber paradigm within IEC 61850 framework. This data was gen-
erated at publisher IEDs to subscribers at 4ms intervals in compliance with the IEC
61850 framework. The data was read via a custom Python program at IED1 and
transmitted via the network using TCP or UDP sockets. Data arrival times were
also computed by the same Python program that checked the time labels of pack-
ets at the destination IED2. In all the experiments, we run the simulation for 60
seconds. The link failure was performed at the 30th second of the simulation from
Mininet. The SDN controller then realizes the failure and updates the flow tables.
In these experiments, we assessed the performance of this recovery process under a
variety of networking conditions with different metrics as explained next. Note that
we repeated each experiment for 30 times for statistical significance and report the
average of the results.
5.2.2 Benchmarks and Metrics for Testing
In order to test the proposed SDN architecture and resilience features, we created
three different topologies:
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Figure 5.4: Baseline network topology used in evaluations.
1) Baseline Topology : This is the normal topology where we had a single link among
the substation switches. This is used for comparison purposes and displayed at
Figure 5.4; 2) Proposed Topology : This is the topology we propose for resiliency as
shown in Figure 5.6. We were able to define a wireless link among two switches
Switch1 and Switch2. The wireless protocol for testing purposes was IEEE 802.11a
using using the ns-3 channel described earlier; and 3) Test Topology : We also aimed
to compare the performance of our proposed topologies with the case when we have
double wired links between Switch1 and Switch2 as shown in Figure 5.5 . The links
were based on 100Mbps Ethernet simulated via ns-3. These topologies are referred
to as Baseline, Proposed/Wireless and Proposed/Test respectively in the rest of the
section. In addition, we consider two cases for TCP and UDP protocols respectively.
This is because MMS works above the IP layer and thus we considered the impact on
the performance of TCP connection establishment and how recovery was performed.
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Figure 5.5: Network topology used to compare with proposed one in evaluations.
As performance metrics, we considered the end-to-end delay and packet loss
metrics from source to a particular sub-station destination using the three differ-
ent topologies with both TCP and UDP. Since myriads of packets were sent, we
computed the average delay and packet loss ratio for all the packets.
5.2.3 Performance Results
End-to-end and Recovery Delay. One of the crucial things in the recovery is the total
time to restore the connection. Therefore, we conducted TCP and UDP experiments
for each of the topologies. Due to space constraints, we only reported the end-to-end
delay of the Proposed/Wireless approach for each packet under TCP and UDP as
seen in Fig. 5.9 and Fig. 5.12 considering one particular experiment run.
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Figure 5.6: Proposed network topology used in evaluations.
The delay distribution for UDP demonstrates that there is only a peak of delay
around 30th second for a few number of packets. Once the flow is changed to
wireless, the delay becomes stable though it increases slightly due to wireless channel
bandwidth. We also note that the recovery time in the Proposed/Wireless approach
is totaling around 12.1ms on average, which is much better than that of MPLS-based
Ethernet auto-negotiation [LLS04] reported as 29.54ms (on UDP). The recovery
delay is also acceptable for Smart Grid monitoring applications, which require a
latency of 10-100ms [DKG+14].
However, same observations are not valid for TCP due to its reliability mecha-
nisms such as re-transmissions and slow start with wireless. There is still a peak
during the recovery time, but similar peaks may occur later due to wireless character-
istics. When we closely analyzed the starting times of the packet transmissions, we
realized that there is a transient period between 30th and 31st seconds where there
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Figure 5.7: End-to-end Delay packet distribution for the Baseline Topology under
TCP between the 29th and 32nd seconds of the simulation.
was no transmissions occurring. We observed that this was due to re-establishing the
TCP connection phase (i.e., SYN-SYN/ACK-ACK) between the source and desti-
nation even though the link failure was handled. This is an interesting outcome due
to changing ports of the ACK message coming back to Switch1 which might have
triggered a TCP connection re-establishment. In total, we observed that there was
about 1050ms in average impasse time for Proposed/Wireless approach. Obviously,
this is much higher than UDP due to connection re-establishment. However, such
increase brings the benefit of reliability as will be discussed in the next subsection.
Since the above results are only showing a particular shot, we wanted to test the
significance of the proposed approach by computing the average of all 30 runs. To
do this, we separately reported the behavior of packet delay before, during and after
the failure by dividing the total time into three slots as Time1 (0-29sec), Time2
(30-31sec) and Time3 (31-60) respectively. As can be seen in Table 5.1, the delay
increases during the period of failure of the main wired link between Switch1 and 2
for all cases. This is expected since there is the time for the controller to detect the
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Figure 5.8: End-to-end Delay packet distribution for the Topology with 2 Wired
Links under TCP between the 29th and 32nd seconds of the simulation.
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Figure 5.9: End-to-end Delay packet distribution for the Proposed/Wireless Ap-
proach under TCP between the 29th and 32nd seconds of the simulation.
failure and update the flow table of Switch1. However, the increase is much more in
the wireless case which can be attributed to the nature and bandwidth of the wireless
communication under TCP. For the packets that are lost due to link failure, there
are retransmissions and these are taking more time due to poor performance of TCP
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Figure 5.10: End-to-end Delay packet distribution for the Baseline Topology under
UDP between the 29th and 32nd seconds of the simulation.
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Figure 5.11: End-to-end Delay packet distribution for the Topology with 2 Wired
Links under UDP between the 29th and 32nd seconds of the simulation.
with wireless link failures [XPMS01] and also due to limited capacity in terms of
channel capacity.
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Figure 5.12: End-to-end Delay packet distribution for Proposed/Wireless Approach
under UDP between the 29th and 32nd seconds of the simulation.
When we repeated the same experiments with UDP, we have seen a similar
pattern but this time the gaps are not large (Table 5.2). This can be explained as
follows: Since there is no retransmission mechanism in UDP, the lost packets are
not retransmitted and thus their delays are not increased as in the case of TCP.
Although there is still a delay due to recovery time, this does not dominate the
overall packet delay.
Table 5.1: TCP Packet Transmission Times
Network Avg. Transmission Delay (microsecond)
Topology Time-1 Time-2 Time-3
Proposed/Wireless 346 825 547
Proposed/Test 264 371 271
Baseline 295 301 290
Packet Loss. One of the other concerns is the possibility of packet loss when they
are in transit to Switch2 and the link fails. During the same experiments conducted
above, we also reported the number of lost packets for both TCP and UDP under all
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Table 5.2: UDP Packet Transmission Times
Network Avg. Transmission Delay (microsecond)
Topology Time-1 Time-2 Time-3
Proposed/Wireless 481 582 591
Proposed/Test 486 482 475
Baseline 494 452 460
approaches. The results are shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. Looking at these results,
we observe that TCP can perfectly recover all the packets that might get lost due to
switching to the redundant links for both wired and wireless cases. However, this is
not the case for UDP where some of the packets can get loss compared to the baseline
case where we do not have any link failures. The reason is due to the end-to-end
reliability mechanism of TCP which retransmits the lost packets at the destination.
Note that we determined in the previous subsection that TCP re-establishes the
connection among the source and destination when a link in the path is broken. In
this way, lost packets are re-transmitted through this new connection.
Table 5.3: Total Packet and Packet Loss at TCP
Network Topology Total Packet Number Packet Loss
Proposed/Wireless 8552 0
Proposed/Test 9499 0
Baseline 10197 0
Table 5.4: Total Packet and Packet Loss at UDP
Network Topology Total Packet Number Packet Loss
Proposed/Wireless 13266 3
Proposed/Test 13158 5
Baseline 13182 0
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
We explained how the emerging SDN paradigm could be considered as a viable
technology for the Smart Grid communication architecture, which is currently under
massive modernization effort by the utility providers. We discussed how flexibility
and ease of control, management, security, and maintenance provided by the SDN
technology could make a compelling case for applying SDN in three unique smart
grid deployments: Specifically, we focused on SCADA systems, AMI, and Microgrid
Systems and discussed how an increasing number of smart grid devices that are being
deployed to connect all the components of the Smart Grid together could benefit
from the SDN. Finally, we summarized the existing research challenges regarding
the security of SDNs in general before discussing potential security threats with
SDN-enabled Smart Grid. We provided some general solutions to alleviate the
threats. Applying the maturing SDN technology into the smart grid infrastructure
presents ample unique research challenges in security and networking to engineers
and scientists.
In addition, we focused on MMS-based substation communications and devel-
oped an SDN-enabled network for testing in Mininet. The communication channels
were simulated using ns-3 and real Smart Grid traffic. Our goal was to test the
ability of SDN to recover failed links in real-time without losing any packets and
significantly increasing the packet delay.
Evaluation results indicated that SDN can provide seamless resiliency in case
of the availability of redundant wireless links for real-time protocols such as MMS.
Despite a minor delay increase in UDP, the maximum packet delay is still within
the bounds of monitoring applications and the recovery time is much less than that
of a route update or MPLS-based approach. For TCP, we observed that there is a
44
higher delay to restart transmissions due to re-establishment of the TCP connection
without loosing any packets. In the future, we plan to evaluate LTE and other
protocols that can be used to send data.
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